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Abstract
A number of theoretical models, loosely characterized under the rubric of behavioral ﬁ
nance, suggest that price convergence to value is far from instantaneous and possibly involves
interplay between noise and informed traders. These models are motivated by documented
anomalous patterns in equity markets and assume some form of psychological bias that aﬀects
investor behavior. With the beneﬁt of hindsight it seems clear that the technology sector went
through a bubble-like pattern in the late 1990s and that investor biases (if indeed they exist and
can be inferred) may have been even more pronounced. Accordingly, our study focuses on the
medium-term aftermarket in high-tech US IPOs during this period. Using both ordered logit
regression and split-population hazard modeling approaches, we document momentum and
reversal patterns that are consistent with the predictions of some behavioral ﬁnance models.
Our ﬁndings indicate that momentum variables are important while fundamental variables
have at best weak explanatory power.
JEL classiﬁcation: G14; C41
Keywords: Investor psychology; Technology bubble; Momentum; Underwriter reputation

1. Introduction
A number of empirical studies relating to IPOs have documented two persistent
so-called anomalies: the initial underpricing and the long-run underperformance of

IPO ﬁrms. These patterns have been documented in various markets and sample pe
riods. 1 The theoretical work has mainly attempted to explain the initial underpricing
phenomenon. 2 Some researchers have argued that the long-run underperformance
of IPO ﬁrms is not a true anomaly and that the results are sensitive to the way in
which long-term returns are calculated. 3 Regardless of whether the long-run perfor
mance of IPO ﬁrms is inferior to or about the same as a control group, there is little
doubt that the empirical IPO literature suggests signiﬁcant initial price momentum
and a relatively slow convergence to value.
As a parallel development, the capital markets literature now embraces a more
complex view of price discovery. A number of theoretical models, loosely character
ized under the rubric of behavioral ﬁnance, suggest that price convergence to value is
far from instantaneous (or even guaranteed) and possibly involves interplay between
noise and informed traders. 4 Most of these models were developed as theoretical un
derpinnings to the mounting empirical literature on capital market anomalies that
challenged one of the bulwarks of modern ﬁnance: the eﬃcient markets hypothesis.
However, the issue is far from settled and the debate continues. 5
Many securities markets appear to exhibit short-run momentum and long-run re
versals. 6 The theories that have emerged to explain this pattern have relied on one or
more forms of psychological biases that seemingly inﬂuence investor behavior. For
instance, Daniel et al. (1998), hereafter referred to as DHS, theorize that investor
overconﬁdence causes overreaction to private signals, undue self-attribution bias 7
induces the overreaction to continue in the short-run, while the long-run reversal
is necessarily implied by the initial overreaction.
In our opinion, the overheated high-tech IPO environment of the late 1990s is an
ideal testing ground of the DHS and possibly other behavioral theories. The initial
underpricing of IPOs is likely to be even more pronounced for the high-tech subset
and an appropriate examination of the aftermarket will uncover momentum and re
versal patterns if they exist. Focusing on high-tech IPOs rather than including all
technology companies (or simply looking at a market index) has the advantage of
a deﬁned starting point for each ﬁrm in the sample. Also, we thought it likely that
studying the IPO aftermarket has the potential to reveal momentum and/or reversal
patterns in months rather than years. In other words, our approach may uncover
patterns implied by behavioral ﬁnance models like DHS in sharp relief and over a
1
See Loughran et al. (1994) for a survey of the international evidence. Also see Jain and Kini (1994),
Lee et al. (1996) and Loughran and Ritter (1995).
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See Rock (1986), Welch (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and
Loughran and Ritter (2002a).
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examples of behavioral ﬁnance models.
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Investors subject to self-attribution bias interpret validating public signals as conﬁrmation of their
ability while contrary signals are discounted.

collapsed time period. While the results may not be completely generalizable to a
wider sample, we think the beneﬁts of our sample choice outweigh the limitations.
It should be noted that an examination of aftermarket patterns cannot be a di
rect test of a particular behavioral ﬁnance model. We have chosen to highlight
DHS because the overconﬁdence and self-attribution biases appear to ring true
in the context of the previously documented IPO anomalies. Other theories such
as those proposed by Shiller (1984), Barberis et al. (1998) or Hong and Stein
(1999) make plausible assumptions about investor behavior and possibly could
apply just as well.
Speciﬁcally, we examine the medium-term (6-month) aftermarket in high-tech US
IPOs launched in the late 1990s. We assume the perspective of an investor who has
no preferential allotment and has access only to easily available and virtually costless
information in the public domain. As explained above, the sample is deliberately
narrowly drawn. Our high-tech IPO ﬁrms fall primarily in the following sectors:
computer hardware/software, e-commerce, telecommunications and biotechnology.
Clearly, these sectors are perceived to have huge potential for future growth and
proﬁtability but individual ﬁrms and their investors face considerable uncertainty
about the viability of their technology and/or business models.
We ﬁrst employ an ordered logit regression (OLR) approach, which involves set
ting up a hierarchy of thresholds of post-IPO market-adjusted returns – this is
loosely in the spirit of investor determined price targets. We ﬁnd that fundamental
variables like pre-IPO proﬁtability and age of the company have weak inﬂuence at
best in explaining post-IPO returns. The aftermarket is driven almost entirely by mo
mentum variables. We also document post-IPO overreaction and reversal patterns
consistent with the DHS theory. In order to ensure that the results are robust to
an alternative estimation procedure, we also implement a split-population hazard
(SPH) modeling approach. This yields results broadly consistent with those from
the OLR. In Section 2, we outline the research hypotheses and describe the sample
and variables used in the study. Section 3 contains a discussion of the OLR method
and results. The SPH procedure and results are described in Section 4. The ﬁnal sec
tion contains concluding comments.

2. Research hypotheses, sample and variable descriptions
2.1. Research hypotheses
The essence of the DHS theory in an IPO aftermarket framework is shown in Fig.
1. Given a favorable private signal, investor overconﬁdence pushes the stock price
above its rational expected level at time 1. (In the context of our application, this
would represent Day 1 IPO underpricing.) If public signals are perceived as conﬁrm
ing the initial private assessment, self-attribution bias drives the price even higher
and further away from the rational level at time 2 (short-run positive momentum
in the IPO aftermarket). The arrival of further public information gradually induces
the price back toward the fundamental level at time 3 and beyond (reversal of the
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Fig. 1. Hypothesized price patterns with investors exhibiting overconﬁdence and self-attribution biases in
the IPO aftermarket. Investors receive a private signal at time 0 to the eﬀect that the IPO is underpriced;
overconﬁdence on their part causes the Day 1 price to overshoot the rational level. Public signals at time 1
reinforce the private assessment and self-attribution bias causes the price to rise even further at time 2.
Reversal sets in beyond time 2. This graph is adapted from Fig. 1, p. 1847 of DHS. The discrete time points
are purely illustrative. For instance, actual time between time 0 and time 1 may be just one day. The dis
tance between time 1 and time 2 could be several weeks and so on.

initial positive momentum). This theoretical framework allows us to formulate the
following research hypotheses:
H1. If investor biases along the lines suggested by DHS exist in the post-IPO envi
ronment, we should observe aftermarket patterns that exhibit short-run positive
momentum and gradual reversal in cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMARs).
H2. IPO aftermarket patterns will be primarily a function of publicly observable
momentum variables rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc fundamental variables.
2.2. Sample description
In executing the study, we assume the perspective of an investor who has no pref
erential allotment in the IPO and has access only to freely available information. Our
self-imposed constraint is that the investor should be able to implement her strategy
without access to large research departments or subscriptions to expensive data
bases. Accordingly, our primary sample of high-tech ﬁrms was drawn from ipo.com,
which lists the universe of US IPOs with dates, oﬀer prices etc. broken down in a
number of categories. We chose all IPOs from January 1, 1998 through October

30, 1999 in the following sectors: biotechnology, computer hardware, computer soft
ware, electronics, Internet services, Internet software and telecommunications. This
resulted in a sample of 301 high-tech IPO ﬁrms. 8
The Day 1 open price and daily open prices for each ﬁrm in the sample and the
corresponding NASDAQ index level are downloaded for 125 trading days (�6
months) beyond the IPO date from yahoo ﬁnance and edreyfus.com. 9 We decided
on a 6 month aftermarket window for a number of reasons. The study is predicated
on previous work documenting initial underpricing and long-run underperformance
(or at least the lack of superior long-run performance) of IPO ﬁrms. The hypothe
sized price–value divergence of interest relates to the IPO event and future events
such as seasoned oﬀerings or mergers would confound the ﬁndings – hence the study
period cannot be too long. On the other hand, the period has to be long enough for
the anomaly to play out and a meaningful timing strategy implemented from a prac
titioner viewpoint. Also, the lockup period after which founders can sell their shares
generally expires after 6 months. This may introduce a source of uncertainty in the
post 6-month aftermarket that we wanted to avoid. Finally, there was a structural
market correction in the technology sector in mid 2000. Given that our high-tech
IPO sample runs through October 1999, we felt it was important to avoid any com
plicating biases arising from the market correction. All these factors taken together
convinced us that a 6-month aftermarket window was the appropriate choice.
2.3. Description of variables
To study aftermarket patterns, we decided to adopt a framework that involves
setting up a hierarchy of thresholds of post-IPO market-adjusted returns – loosely
in the spirit of investor determined price targets. Accordingly, the dependent variable
is constructed on the basis of an event, which is deﬁned when the CMAR for a ﬁrm
crosses a given threshold.
Let Pi1 represent the Day 1 open price of the ith ﬁrm and let Pm1 be the corre
sponding level of the market (Nasdaq) index. Similarly, Pit and Pmt represent the open
price at time t of the ith ﬁrm and the market respectively. The CMAR of the ﬁrm at
time t is calculated as
CMARit ¼

Pit =Pi1
Pmt =Pm1

1:

ð1Þ

The time in question does not refer to calendar time, but to the time from the IPO
date. We use 25%, 50%, and 100% as thresholds for the OLR and SPH models. For
instance, an event occurs when the CMARit exceeds 50%. The following categories
are useful in explaining the construction of the dependent variable for the OLR and
SPH models. Each category represents the best possible return in the 6-month period
8

The original sample was 316; 15 ﬁrms are dropped due to incomplete information on one or more
explanatory variables.
9
Price data were cross-checked for validity from alternate sources.

beyond the IPO date. For instance, for Category 4, a return greater than 100% (>1)
is not possible.
Categories
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It may appear to the reader that the manner in which we construct our thresholds
that deﬁne the ordered categories or even the number of categories is somewhat
ad hoc. This is quite true but far from being a shortcoming, this is actually an advan
tage in the context of our application. It allows the individual investor to set her own
bar in terms of CMAR expectation while the model itself is ﬂexible enough to ac
commodate (within reason) any number of categories.
The crucial issues that we address in this paper are as follows: What is the prob
ability that an average ﬁrm's market adjusted returns will cross a given threshold?
How does this probability change over time in the 6-month IPO aftermarket? (see
H1 above). Does this probability depend on fundamental or momentum variables?
(see H2 above). It is worth noting that while we draw upon the DHS framework
to formulate our research questions, the theory itself seeks to provide a general ex
planation of market under- and overreactions and does not provide direction on the
choice of proxy variables for particular applications. Accordingly, potential explan
atory variables, X , are selected with guidance from the empirical IPO literature and
researcher intuition. The data sources used are ipo.com, FISonline, Hoovers.com,
and Carter et al. (1998). The variables and our rationale for their selection are
described below:

Variable

Expected sign

Percentage price change: Initial underpricing (or overpricing
variable) that measures the change from the oﬀer price to
the open price. If the IPO is severely underpriced, we
expect aftermarket momentum to be subdued

Negative

Adjusted return in week 1: Momentum (purely technical)
variable representing the average market-adjusted return
in the ﬁrst week of trading. It is a proxy for the favorable
public signal that might induce the DHS self-attribution bias

Positive

Market return in week 1: Momentum (purely technical)
variable representing the average market return in the
ﬁrst week of trading. It represents a second-order proxy
for the self-attribution bias

Positive

Variable

Expected sign

Net income/revenue: Net income divided by revenue in the
pre-IPO year. A fundamental variable that is a proxy for
ﬁrm quality

Positive or
no eﬀect

Underwriter reputation: Lead underwriter's reputation
based on the Carter–Manaster measure. It has been used in
previous work to explain underpricing. If accurate pricing
goes together with underwriter reputation, we expect
post-IPO biases to be reduced

Negative

Oﬀer size: Oﬀer price multiplied by the number of shares
sold in the IPO. We use the log value of the oﬀer size.
The variable is a proxy for size

Negative

Green shoe dummy: Dummy variable for a green shoe
provision in the IPO contract. This provision gives the
underwriter the option to purchase additional shares at
the oﬀer price to cover over allotments. Presence of the
provision indirectly increases underwriter compensation

No prior

Computer software and hardware dummy: Dummy variable
takes value 1 if the ﬁrm belongs either to the computer
hardware or software sectors

No prior

Internet services and software dummy: Dummy variable
takes value 1 if the ﬁrm belongs either to the Internet
services or Internet software sectors. A sense that within
the high-tech sector, the business models of Internet ﬁrms
(e-commerce or e-commerce enablers) are more uncertain

Positive

Telecommunications dummy: Dummy variable takes
value 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to the telecommunications sector

No prior

Age before the IPO: Represents the number of years from
the date the ﬁrm was incorporated to the IPO date.
A fundamental variable that is a weak proxy for ﬁrm quality

Positive or
no eﬀect

Table 1 provides a comparison between the distribution of ﬁrms across the ﬁve
categories if the investor always cashes out at the point when the threshold is reached
versus the distribution that results if a simple 6-month 'buy and hold' (BH) strategy
is adopted. It should be noted that 'selling at the threshold' (ST) is based on perfect
hindsight and that BH is a na€ıve strategy that involves buying every IPO stock at the
Day 1 open price and selling it after six months. Nonetheless, the contrast is striking.
With the ST strategy, 112 ﬁrms (37.2% of the total) end up in category 5 (CMAR

Table 1
Distribution of IPO ﬁrms across categories based on BH and ST strategies
Number of ﬁrms

Categories
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5

( 6 0)
(0, 0.25]
(0.25, 0.50]
(0.50, 1.0]
(>1)

BH strategy

ST strategy

170
21
27
29
54

48
50
37
54
112

The BH strategy involves buying at the Day 1 open price and selling exactly six months later.
The ST strategy assumes perfect hindsight and requires buying at the Day 1 open price and selling at the
point the threshold (not necessarily price peak) is reached.
For both BH and ST strategies, observations in a category are based on the best possible returns. For
instance, for an observation in C4, greater than 100% (>1) return in the 6-month period beyond the IPO
date is not possible.

exceeding 100%) whereas only 54 ﬁrms (17.9% of the total) achieve the same
result under BH. Also, the numbers of ﬁrms ending up in category 1 (negative
CMAR) are 48 (15.9% of total) for the ST versus 170 (56.5% of total) for the BH
strategy.
The advantage of ST over BH is even more compelling when the mean CMARs
are examined. In Table 2, we present the CMARs associated with holding on to the
position for 6-months instead of cashing out at the point when the threshold is
reached. For instance in category C4, the ST strategy would garner mean CMARs
between 50% and 100% by construction (61.39% to be exact). However, if the long
position in the 54 ﬁrms that make it to C4 under the ST strategy were maintained for
6-months, the mean CMAR shrinks to )4.70%. For C3, the swing is from 31.06% to
)26.17%.

Table 2
Mean market-adjusted returns based on ST and after 6-months in the various categories deﬁned by the ST
strategy
Categories
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5

( 6 0)
(0, 0.25]
(0.25, 0.50]
(0.50, 1.0]
(>1)

Number of ﬁrms
(ST strategy)

Mean returns at ST
(%)

Mean 6-month returns
(%)

48
50
37
54
112

)57.40
5.88
31.06
61.39
118.15

)57.40
)44.79
)26.17
)4.70
133.67

The mean 6-month returns represent the returns to investors who hold on to the long position for 6
months instead of ST.
In category C4, the ST strategy would garner a mean market-adjusted return of between 50 and 100% by
construction (61.39% to be exact). However, if the long position in the 54 ﬁrms that make it to C4 under
the ST strategy were maintained for 6-months, the mean market-adjusted return shrinks to )4.70%.

Table 3
Average factor values across the categories based on the ST strategy
Variables

C1
(60)

Percentage price change
97.91
Adjusted return in week 1 )21.17
Market return in week 1
)0.47
Net income/revenue
)1.02
Underwriter reputation
0.75
Oﬀer size
17.75
Green shoe dummy
0.44
Computer software and
0.15
hardware dummy
Internet services and
0.73
software dummy
Telecommunications
0.10
dummy
Age before the IPO
4.64
(in years)
Number of observations
48

C2
(0, 0.25]

C3
(0.25, 0.50]

C4
(0.50, 1.0]

C5
(>1)

All

62.06
)4.08
)0.16
)1.95
0.64
17.94
0.50
0.18

51.48
1.14
)0.29
)2.17
0.89
17.98
0.68
0.24

57.81
4.29
0.56
)1.39
0.76
18.05
0.65
0.13

51.87
15.51
0.51
)2.05
0.88
17.96
0.60
0.16

61.92
2.63
0.15
)1.77
0.80
17.94
0.57
0.17

0.50

0.43

0.57

0.67

0.60

0.20

0.27

0.24

0.14

0.18

6.07

6.17

5.71

4.82

5.33

50

37

54

112

301

Table 3 contains descriptive statistics (mean values of explanatory variables)
across the categories deﬁned by the ST strategy. It is interesting to note that the
48 ﬁrms that end up in category C1 (strictly negative CMARs beyond the Day 1
open price) were underpriced by 98% on average compared to 62% for the total
sample. 10
Tables 1 and 2 indicate that for all ﬁrms in categories C2 and above (253 ﬁrms
representing 84% of the sample), the aftermarket CMAR exhibits momentum and
many of the ﬁrms suﬀer a reversal within a 6-month period. The explanatory vari
ables deﬁned above may capture aftermarket momentum eﬀects but not reversal –
a phenomenon that is central to our inquiry.
Therefore, we construct two additional (artiﬁcial) variables for the OLR model.
The ﬁrst such variable (time) represents the time in weeks from the IPO date
to the optimal sell date (deﬁned as the date the threshold is reached, not necessarily
the peak stock price) and the second variable is simply time squared to capture the
implicit non-linearity (or reversal). We fully realize that these two variables involve
ex post look back and cannot be used in a pure predictive model. However, as dis
cussed in the following OLR results section, we will show that it is possible to sim
ulate the eﬀect of the time variables to estimate the probabilities of ending up in the
various categories by evaluating the other non-look back variables.

10

Loughran and Ritter (2002b, Table 2) report average ﬁrst-day returns to Technology and Internetrelated IPOs of 81.1% in the 1999–2000 period and 22.7% in the 1990–98 period. Our sample underpricing
average of 61.9% is clearly representative for the 1998–99 period. Also, see Arosio et al. (2000).

3. Ordered logit regression model and results
3.1. OLR methodology
We execute an OLR in which the dependent variable is based on the CMARit .
OLR models are useful when the dependent variable represents an outcome of a de
cision between a ﬁnite set of alternatives that are naturally ordered (see Greene,
2000). Examples include opinion surveys (strongly agree, agree, disagree and
strongly disagree), insurance coverage (full, partial, none), bond ratings, etc. In this
application, a ﬁrm's aftermarket IPO performance falls into one of the ﬁve ordered
categories deﬁned above. The OLR model seeks to explain the inﬂuence of variables
on the probability of the ﬁrm falling into these categories.
Consider Y1 , Y2 , Y3 , Y4 , Y5 where Yj , representing category j above, equals 1 if
CMARit exceeds some threshold value; 0 otherwise. For instance, for Category 5,
Y5 ¼ 1 if CMARit > 1.0 and Y1 ¼ Y2 ¼ Y3 ¼ Y4 ¼ 0. Similarly Y4 ¼ 1 if CMARit > 0.5,
but never exceeds 1, and Y1 ¼ Y2 ¼ Y3 ¼ Y5 ¼ 0. The above categories are deﬁned
when the threshold is ﬁrst reached. At this point, the time variable deﬁned as the
number of weeks after the IPO date is also recorded. For instance if the ﬁrm's
CMAR becomes 100% in 20 trading days, Y5 equals 1 and the time variable takes
on value 4. For the worst category (Y1 ¼ 1) the adjusted return is never positive
and the time variable is set equal to zero.
In the estimation process, consider an underlying performance variable (Z) that is
continuous but only the discrete response is observed. Also, consider the following
grid that slots ﬁrms in to the various categories:
Y1 ¼ 1

j Y2 ¼ 1 j Y3 ¼ 1 j Y4 ¼ 1 j Y5 ¼ 1 j
c1
c2
c3
c4
c0

Z

P ðY1 ¼ 1Þ ¼ P ðZ < c0 Þ, P ðY2 ¼ 1Þ ¼ P ðc0 6 Z < c1 Þ, etc. For an ordered logit
model,
P ðZ < cj Þ ¼

1
1 þ expðb0 þ b1 X1 þ · · · þ bk Xk

cj Þ

:

ð2Þ

The coeﬃcient bj measures the inﬂuence of the explanatory variable Xj on the
probability of falling into a particular category. The c's are the unknown parameters
to be estimated along with the b's. These probabilities are used to specify the follow
ing log-likelihood function that is maximized to obtain the parameter estimates:
"
#
N
5
X
X
£¼
ðYj ¼ 1Þ ln P ðYj ¼ 1Þ :
ð3Þ
i¼1

j¼1

The results of the OLR are reported in Table 4. It should be noted that the inter
pretation of the coeﬃcients in an OLR is not straightforward. However, in our ap
plication, a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient implies that the variable positively
inﬂuences the probability of a good outcome from the investor's point of view,

Table 4
OLR model estimates
Parameters

Estimates (t-statistics)

Constant

3.185
(1.113)
1.040'
(11.541)
)0.036'
()9.853)
)0.002
()1.349)
0.106'
(10.785)
0.167'
(3.060)
0.028
(0.674)
0.662''
(1.896)
)0.200
()1.200)
0.551'
(2.013)
0.405
(0.605)
1.421'
(2.140)
0.012
(0.017)
0.005
(0.191)

Time
Time-squared
Percentage price change
Market-adjusted return in week 1
Market return in week 1
Net income/revenue
Underwriter reputation
Oﬀer size
Green shoe dummy
Computer software and hardware dummy
Internet services and software dummy
Telecommunications dummy
Age before the IPO (in years)
'

and '' denote signiﬁcance at 5% and 10% level respectively.
The dependent variable is captured in terms of the dummy variables Y1 , Y2 , Y3 , Y4 , Y5 where Yj ¼ 1 if
cumulative market adjusted exceeds a given threshold value; 0 otherwise.

i.e., the probability that the CMAR will end up in category 4 (50–100% range) or 5
(>100% range) and vice versa.
3.2. Discussion of OLR results
The hypothesized momentum and reversal eﬀects are strongly conﬁrmed. Both
momentum (biased self-attribution) proxy variables: the IPO ﬁrm's average mar
ket-adjusted return and the average market (Nasdaq) return in the ﬁrst week following
the IPO have positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Further, the time and timesquared variables are also strongly signiﬁcant with positive and negative coeﬃcients
respectively. In the context of the DHS price formation theory, overconﬁdent inves
tors cause stock prices to overreact initially (the jump from oﬀer to market open
price), biased self-attribution potentially induced by upward movement in the IPO
ﬁrm's stock price and the market generally in the week following the IPO causes a

further overreaction (the continuation of positive returns implied by our momentum
variables) and the eventual reversal sets in as price–value convergence is induced
with the continual arrival of public information (inferred from our time-squared
variable and the patterns documented in Tables 1 and 2). From the speculative in
vestor's point of view, it pays to hold the stock for a while in the initial period after
the IPO because the probability of landing in the higher categories is improving but
as more time passes, this probability wanes.
Also, as hypothesized, fundamental variables do not appear to inﬂuence the IPO
aftermarket. For instance, the proﬁtability (or lack thereof) of the ﬁrm measured as
net income/revenue in the pre-IPO year has no eﬀect. Similarly, the number of years
that the ﬁrm has been in business prior to the IPO (age before the IPO) does not seem
to matter. These are classic 'old-economy' variables that supposedly enable forma
tion of expectations about future cash ﬂows and/or risk. Also, the extent of initial
underpricing (measured as the percentage price change from the IPO oﬀer price to
the Day 1 open market price) does not play a role in the aftermarket. Perhaps the
IPO oﬀer price in conjunction with the ﬁrst available market price (Day 1 open) sub
sumes other fundamental information (such as proﬁtability and ﬁrm age) contained
in the prospectus and therefore these variables ought not to aﬀect aftermarket prices
in an eﬃcient markets framework. However, a less benign explanation is that mo
mentum investors, for whom fundamental variables do not matter, dominate the im
mediate aftermarket.
Some variables related to the IPO contract do seem to matter. Underwriter repu
tation 11 (contrary to our prior) and the presence of a green shoe provision are asso
ciated with positive aftermarket returns while the oﬀer size appears to have no eﬀect.
Within the high-tech umbrella, designation as an Internet ﬁrm is associated with pos
itive aftermarket returns; other industry dummy variables are insigniﬁcant.
It is worth exploring the underwriter reputation variable a little further. We had
expected that it would be negatively related to aftermarket returns – the logic being
that highly ranked underwriters would set a more accurate oﬀer price and a percep
tion of fairer pricing would dampen aftermarket biases. In fact earlier studies do sug
gest that initial underpricing (or the amount of money left on the table by the IPO
ﬁrm) is inversely related to underwriter reputation (see Carter et al., 1998). But this
relationship seems to have ﬂipped (turned positive) in the 1990s and especially in the
1999–2000 period (see Loughran and Ritter, 2002b, Table 7). Why should this be the
case? Loughran and Ritter (2002b) propose two hypotheses: (a) ‘‘the analyst cover
age hypothesis’’ – the idea here is that the issuing ﬁrm places more importance on
snagging a lead underwriter with a highly ranked analyst to cover the ﬁrm and downplays underpricing; and (b) ‘‘the corruption hypothesis’’ – this refers to side pay
ments made by the underwriter to founders and senior executives of the issuing
ﬁrm usually in the form of allocation of shares in other hot IPOs.
11
The original analysis was done using the Carter–Manaster reputation rankings. We found that
almost all the lead underwriters in our sample were at the high end (>7). We ultimately substituted the
Carter–Manaster number with a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the underwriter ranking was
greater than 7; 0 otherwise.

We think that these hypotheses are compatible with the DHS theory and our own
ﬁndings. The source of investor overconﬁdence and self-attribution biases particu
larly in technology stocks could well have been less-than-objective sell-side analyst
recommendations serving as public signals. Numerous recent stories in the business
press have reported on the conﬂicts of interests and the breaching of Chinese walls
between the brokerage-advice and investment banking divisions at major Wall Street
ﬁrms. 12 If anything, underwriter incentives are served ﬁrstly through underpricing
but also by propping up the price in the aftermarket so that their preferred clients
can bail out in an orderly manner.
We do not wish to convey the impression that the DHS theory is the only expla
nation for the momentum/reversal patterns that we document in the high-tech IPO
aftermarket. It is however a reasonably convincing theoretical framework within
which it is possible to formulate and empirically test hypotheses, as we have at
tempted to do in this study. There are a number of other theories that also attempt
to explain generally the less-than-eﬃcient market reaction to various types of events.
For instance Hong and Stein (1999) postulate two classes of investors: momentum
investors who chase price trends and ignore fundamental information causing price
overreactions in the process; and news watchers who use fundamental information
but ignore prices and are thereby the source for underreactions. It is possible that
the IPO aftermarket patterns that we detect could be explained in such a frame
work. 13 The DHS theory does have the advantage of being grounded in psycholog
ical biases that have been veriﬁed in experimental settings. In our opinion, it would
be diﬃcult if not impossible to design an empirical study using capital market data to
directly test any of the behavioral ﬁnance theories.
Our OLR model cannot be used in a traditional predictive sense because the time
variable is constructed using ex post look back. However, it is possible to simulate
the probabilities of various outcomes for diﬀerent values of the time variable. In
Fig. 2, we report the results of the simulation analysis that generates predicted pro
portions for categories 4 and 5 combined (market-adjusted returns in excess of 50%)
with respect to time expressed in number of weeks, and the other explanatory vari
ables at their actual ex ante values for each ﬁrm. The simulated proportions (or
probabilities) are averaged across our sample of 301 high-tech IPO ﬁrms.
The probability of earning market-adjusted returns of at least 50% increases over
time, peaks at around 14 weeks from the IPO date and wanes thereafter. It is impor
tant to note that the probabilities reported in Fig. 2 are conditional on the time vari
able taking on a positive value. As indicated earlier, the value of the time variable is
determined when the ordered threshold is crossed but takes on a value of zero if the
ﬁrm never does cross any positive market-adjusted return threshold, i.e., ends up
being a category 1 ﬁrm. Therefore, in determining the cash-out point with ex-ante
simulation, the probability estimates that the model generates are overstated. The

12
13

See for instance Morgenson (2002).
Or indeed in other settings as in Shiller (1984), Barberis et al. (1998) or Delong et al. (1990).
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Fig. 2. Predicted probability of 50% or higher returns from an ordered logit model. Results of a simula
tion exercise with respect to the time variable where all other variables are evaluated based on their ex-ante
actual values. Proportions for Categories 4 and 5 simulated for each ﬁrm and then averaged across the
sample. The above simulated results are conditional on positive adjusted returns since we have set time ¼ 0
for negative returns. These results are broadly comparable with raw data. The raw mean of the time vari
able corresponding to each category is given by 0 weeks for C1, 3.8 weeks for C2, 8.1 weeks for C3, 12.7
weeks for C4, and 9.6 weeks for C5.

pattern of the probability numbers (but not the numbers themselves) is the salient
information to be drawn from Fig. 2.

4. Split-population hazard model and results
4.1. SPH methodology
As mentioned earlier, the time variable in our OLR model is constructed artiﬁ
cially with the beneﬁt of ex post look back. We use an alternative statistical tech
nique to endogenize the inﬂuence of 'time' and also to check how well the
aftermarket patterns hold up. Hazard rate models are often employed to explain
the duration of an event of interest (see Greene, 2000). In this paper, we deﬁne an
event when the CMAR crosses a certain threshold. A hazard rate model is used to
capture the eﬀect of various factors on the instantaneous probability that a given
threshold is crossed. Further, it also enables us to capture the timing issue by ana
lyzing how this probability changes over time.
Standard hazard rate models are implicitly based on the assumption of certain
exit implying that the event will eventually be deﬁned. However, since an IPO invest

ment may not always lead to the market-adjusted threshold returns of 25%, 50%, or
100%, we use a SPH model (see Bandopadhyaya and Jaggia (2001) for details) that
takes into account the possibility that for some ﬁrms the exit may never occur. We
run three separate SPH models (for thresholds of 25%, 50%, and 100%) where the
hazard parameters are estimated along with a split parameter that represents the
probability of eventual success.
We observe two kinds of ﬁrms: (a) ﬁrms that reach the threshold (complete obser
vations) and (b) ﬁrms that do not reach the threshold (censored observations). Let a
censoring variable C equal 1 for complete and 0 for censored observations. In stan
dard hazard rate models the contribution of complete and censored observations,
conditional on the X 's, at time t are P ðT ¼ tÞ and P ðT > ti ) respectively. In an
SPH model, the contributions are dP ðT ¼ ti ) and 1 d þ dP ðT > ti Þ respectively
where d represents the probability of eventual success. We use a log-logistic hazard
function given by
hðt; X Þ ¼ expðX bÞata 1 ð1 þ expðb0 X Þta Þ 1 ;

ð4Þ

where b0 X ¼ b0 þ b1 X1 þ b2 X2 þ · · · þ bk Xk , and a is the shape parameter of the
hazard that determines the point after which the hazard declines. It is useful to note
that if a variable has a positive impact on the hazard, then it has a negative impact
on the time it takes to reach a threshold. The log-likelihood function for an SPH is
£¼

N
X

C½ln d þ ln a þ w

2 lnð1 þ ew Þ] þ ð1

CÞ½lnð1

d þ dð1 þ ew ÞÞ ];
1

i¼1

ð5Þ
0

where w ¼ b X þ a ln t and C is a censoring variable. The split parameter d allows the
probability of eventual success to be diﬀerent from one and if the estimated d is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1, the split model converges to a standard hazard model.
4.2. SPH model results and discussion
The results from the SPH regressions for market-adjusted return thresholds of
25%, 50%, and 100% respectively are presented in Table 5. We observe that they
are generally consistent with those obtained from the OLR procedure. The momen
tum variables – the ﬁrm's average market-adjusted return and the average market
(Nasdaq) return in the ﬁrst week following the IPO – are signiﬁcant and positively
inﬂuence the hazard (instantaneous probability of reaching the speciﬁed threshold
given that it has not been achieved up to the previous instant) for all three thresh
olds. Also, the shape parameter a is strongly signiﬁcant and greater than one for
all thresholds. Recall that this parameter in the hazard-modeling context indicates
how 'elapsed time' plays a role in explaining the hazard over time. In our application,
given the log-logistic speciﬁcation, the a estimate indicates that the hazard increases
initially, reaches a peak and then begins to wane. The hypothesized momentumreversal aftermarket patterns are unequivocally conﬁrmed by the SPH modeling
approach.

Table 5
Estimates of the split-population log-logistic hazard models for the 25%, 50%, and 100% thresholds
Parameters
Constant
Percentage price change
Adjusted return in week 1
Market return in week 1
Net income/revenue
Underwriter reputation
Oﬀer size
Green shoe dummy
Computer software and
hardware dummy
Internet services and soft
ware dummy
Telecommunications dummy
Age before the IPO (in years)
a (shape parameter)
d (split parameter)

Estimates (t-value)
25%

50%

100%

)4.198
()1.312)
)0.004'
()2.146)
0.072'
(10.241)
0.103'
(1.991)
)0.027
()0.665)
0.976'
(2.493)
)0.001
()0.005)
1.247'
(4.475)
0.853
(1.211)
1.128
(1.632)
0.367
(0.513)
)0.017
()0.587)
1.453'
(3.721)
0.826'
()4.004)

)1.321
()0.398)
)0.002
()1.114)
0.070'
(10.020)
0.165'
(3.144)
0.079''
(1.880)
0.527
(1.477)
)0.235
()1.212)
0.604'
(2.152)
0.878
(1.260)
1.909'
(2.867)
0.845
(1.217)
0.001
(0.058)
1.382'
(2.701)
0.881
()1.483)

)1.220
()0.311)
)0.004''
()1.799)
0.071'
(8.934)
0.130'
(2.041)
)0.039
()0.790)
1.531'
(3.290)
)0.436''
()1.906)
0.412
(1.255)
1.530''
(1.729)
2.650'
(2.993)
1.007
(1.105)
0.015
(0.398)
1.822'
(4.431)
0.708'
()4.288)

'
and '' denote signiﬁcance at 5% and 10% level respectively.
For a and d, the t-statistic is evaluated at 1.
The regression coeﬃcients capture the inﬂuence of the factors on the hazard. The shape parameter a
determines the point after which the hazard declines. The split parameter d represents the probability of
eventual success.

The fundamental variables, net income/revenue and age before the IPO, are gener
ally insigniﬁcant as we found under OLR; the one exception is that net income/rev
enue is weakly signiﬁcant for the 50% threshold. The inﬂuence of the other
explanatory variables is broadly in line with the OLR ﬁndings. The underwriter rep
utation variable is positively associated with the hazard in all cases and highly signif
icant for the 25% and 100% thresholds. Similarly, the green shoe and the Internet
industry dummy variable coeﬃcients are positive as before but signiﬁcant only in
two out of three cases. One diﬀerence in the SPH ﬁndings is that the underpricing
variable (percentage price change) has the hypothesized negative sign and is signiﬁ
cant in two out three cases. This indicates that the higher the extent of initial under
pricing the lower the probability of crossing the aftermarket threshold. In the OLR
estimation, this coeﬃcient was negative although insigniﬁcant.
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Fig. 3. Aggregate hazard of the split-population log-logistic models for the 25%, 50%, and 100% thresh
olds. The aggregate hazard is calculated for the estimated SPH models with the factors evaluated at their
mean value.

The lack of complete concordance between OLR and SPH is not really surprising
given that they are non-nested statistical procedures involving maximum likelihood
estimation. We are pleased to note that regardless of the procedure, our hypotheses
regarding aftermarket patterns and the dominance of momentum over fundamental
variables hold up very well.
SPH yields an additional insight, i.e., the probability that the threshold will be
reached eventually though not necessarily within 6 months. This point estimate is
captured by the split parameter d, which is strongly signiﬁcant for the 25
(d ¼ 0:826) and 100 (d ¼ 0:708)% thresholds. 14
In Fig. 3, we plot the aggregate hazard against duration in weeks from the IPO
date. We observe that the hazard ramps up in the initial weeks, reaches a peak
and then declines. For the 50% (100%) threshold, the peak is reached at around 5
(13) weeks, which also represents the optimal cash-out points averaged across our
sample. Recall from Fig. 2 that the OLR procedure indicated that the simulated
probability of reaching a threshold of 50% or better (combined probabilities for
the C4 and C5 categories) reached a maximum at 14 weeks. The broad aftermarket
patterns of momentum and reversal are revealed under both modeling approaches.

14

Our model displays a slight inconsistency with regard to the split parameter d. Ideally, we would like
to see a declining estimate as the threshold increases. But the insigniﬁcant d coeﬃcient (0.881) for the 50%
threshold lies above that for the 25% threshold. We reran the model for a 75% threshold and reassuringly
obtained an estimate of 0.72, which is below the 0.826 probability for the 25% threshold and above the
0.708 probability for the 100% threshold.

Note that the aggregate hazard function for the 25% threshold has a more pro
nounced inverted U shape with the peak reached just 2 weeks after the IPO date
and a fairly rapid fall-of thereafter. By contrast, the hazard functions for the 50%
and 100% thresholds rise and fall more gently with the peaks reached at a lower
point than the 25% threshold. This ﬁts with the intuitive expectation that a lower
threshold strategy can be executed relatively quickly with a higher probability of suc
cess. The required holding period increases with the threshold while the probability
of actually reaching the threshold declines, as would be the case with any speculative
investment strategy.
A recent paper by Aggarwal et al. (2002) presents an interesting model where
managers strategically underprice IPOs to maximize wealth by selling shares at lock
up expiration. In their model, initial underpricing generates momentum, which pre
sumably lasts through the lockup expiration date. While our study does not explicitly
control for the lockup expiration, we limit our aftermarket analysis to six months
beyond the IPO date. And as discussed above, the momentum lasts for only a few
weeks before the reversal sets in. Unless the lockup expiration is well below six
months (which seems unlikely) for the ﬁrms in our sample, our results would appear
to contradict the prediction of their model. On the other hand, managers would not
care about market-adjusted returns but simply raw returns and we have not consid
ered unconditional momentum-reversal patterns based on unadjusted aftermarket
prices.

5. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the 6-month aftermarket in high-tech US IPOs launched in
the late 1990s. We draw on the DHS theoretical framework of investor overconﬁ
dence and biased self-attribution to hypothesize short-run positive momentum and
gradual reversal in post IPO returns. Both our methodological approaches (OLR
and SPH) conﬁrm these patterns. We also ﬁnd that momentum variables explain
most of the aftermarket price behavior while fundamental indicators have weak
inﬂuence at best.
At this stage, we are unsure if our results can be replicated with a broader sam
ple and in a more benign investment climate than the late 1990s. Our sense is that
while our narrowly drawn sample may exhibit somewhat more extreme character
istics, the long-standing IPO underpricing anomaly is likely to portend similar if
more muted IPO aftermarket patterns. A number of regulatory changes have oc
curred in recent years. The eﬀective repeal of Glass–Steagall has resulted in signif
icant consolidation in Wall Street ﬁrms – the merger of Citicorp with Salomon
Smith Barney (via the Travelers Group) being a case in point. Market observers
have noted that this development may have exacerbated the potential for conﬂicts
of interest. Also, stock exchanges in the US (and in many other countries) relaxed
listing requirements enabling ﬁrms with limited track records to launch IPOs. So it
is entirely possible that empirical results obtained with data from the 1990s (and
particularly the late 1990s) may not carry over to earlier periods – the Loughran

and Ritter (2002b) paper clearly suggests this in the context of IPO underpricing
and the underlying factors. 15
We believe that the IPO aftermarket is a fertile area for empirical analysis. As the
ﬁnance literature embraces a more nuanced view of market eﬃciency, there may be
unique opportunities to test the predictions of various theories that admit psycholog
ical biases in investor behavior. The late 1990s will also aﬀord researchers the ability
to gain insights into how investor biases can be exploited by opportunistic agents (be
they ﬁnancial intermediaries or insider-managers) in a bubble-like environment. Ap
propriately designed studies will not only deepen our understanding of market be
havior but also inform the public policy debate in the areas of corporate
governance, investor protection and securities law reform.
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